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GARY SHAPIRO "To Philosophize Is to 
Learn to Die" 
In the course of my life I have often had the same 
dream, appearing in different forms at different 
times, but always saying the same thing, "Socra-
tes, practice and cultivate the arts." In the past I 
used to think that it was impelling me and exhort-
ing me to do what I was actually doing: I mean 
that the dream, like a spectator encouraging a 
runner in a race, was urging me on to do what 
I was doing already, that is, practicing the arts, 
because philosophy is the greatest of the arts, and 
I was practicing it. But ever since my trial, while 
the festival of the god has been delaying my exe-
cution, I have felt that it might be this popular 
form of art that the dream intended me to prac-
tice, in which case I ought to practice it and not 
disobey. -Socrates, in Plato's Phaedo, 61 
As the quintessential man of letters, Roland Barthes had the ge-
nial gift of being able to sympathize with an endless variety of 
discourses, texts, myths, and semiotic systems. The profusion of 
apparent subjects-Japan, Brecht, Balzac, photography, "mythol-
ogies," classical writing, the theater-is perhaps calculated to 
provoke the purist who insists on the values of thoroughness and 
well-grounded inquiry. At the same time, one would have to be 
obtuse to fail to recognize the critical projects that animate the 
many books, essays, and studies; these are explorations that put 
into question the often closed and crabbed commitment of the 
scholar or critic to the confines of what he or she knows in "proper" 
serious fashion. 
Barthes's Empire of Signs may stand as the emblem of his po-
lemic with scholarship; it is an imaginary voyage, undertaken by a 
traveler who deliberately eschews a knowledge of the language of 
the country where he travels and dispenses with the apparatus-
extensive studies of history, literature, and culture-that the trav-
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eling scholar typically employs to attain some simulacrum of the 
mastery that is comfortably taken for granted when one is "at 
home" with one's own specialty or Pach. Barthes's desire to slide 
over the surface of Japanese life is, however, tied to his attempt to 
suspend or, as the phenomenologists (to whom we shall return) 
would say, "bracket" the Western metaphysical commitment to 
the values of the center and interiority. Barthes proposes to con-
test these values and the binary categories of center/periphery 
and interior/exterior that they exemplify and reinforce. In attrib-
uting the Western taste for concentric cities with a full center to 
"the very movement of Western metaphysics, for which every 
center is the site of truth," his language comes surprisingly close 
to the philosophical thematics of Derrida and Deleuze.1 We might 
be tempted to say that Barthes is an imaginary traveler in philoso-
phy as well as in Japan. In fact, there are resonances of philoso-
phy and its language(s) throughout Barthes's work, sometimes 
oblique, sometimes polemical, sometimes simply as part of a body 
of reference texts (as in A Lover's Discourse). The first book, Writ-
ing Degree Zero, is a sustained answer to Sartre's What Is Litera-
ture? while the last book, Camera Lucida, is dedicated to Sartre's 
L'Imaginaire; the names of Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Husserl, and a bevy of more recent .French philosophers play 
across Barthes's pages. 
The questions that I wish to pose revolve around the elusive 
relation between Barthes's writing and philosophy. They could be 
elaborated in a series, beginning perhaps with the most simple-
minded: does Barthes have a philosophy? Surely, such a question 
in a Barthesian text would be rewritten: does "Barthes"-who? 
and by what principle of identity?-"have"-what is the notion 
of ownership here?-"a philosophy"?-is philosophy to be con-
strued as oriented toward a single more or less centered and co-
herent system? At the end of such a series of questions we might 
be asking for a nuanced account of the ways in which Barthes is 
tempted by philosophy, fears it, desires it, tentatively tries on its 
robes, analyzes its signs and myths, or inscribes it by citation, 
parody, or temporary adoption of this or that "position" in his 
own texts. The project of assembling the questions and inter-
rogating the texts is a large one; but I have suggested already that 
Barthes is not to be thought of simply as either inside or outside 
of philosophy. 



























